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James Oakes:
I try to write as clearly as I can, to make my points as sharply as possible, but
inevitably even the best writers—those far more adept with words than
I—experience the frustration of having failed to make ourselves as clear as we
ought. Having failed to make myself understood to a reader as astute as Chandra
Manning, I can’t help but feel a bit humbled. Consider her review of my recent
book, The Scorpion’s Sting. Manning rightly reads that little book in light of the
bigger one that preceded it, Freedom National, which I published a year earlier.
On several occasions in her brief review, Manning reads me as saying things that
are quite different from the things I intended to say. Because there’s a lot at stake
in these misunderstanding, I’m compelled to take up more space in my reply than
I have any right to claim.
Briefly, I argue that Republican policymakers came into the Civil War with
two distinct approaches to attacking slavery—a “cordon of freedom"
surrounding the South that would force the slave states to abolish slavery on
their own, and military emancipation. I tried to say, in both books, that both
policies “worked"—several hundred thousand slaves were emancipated and five
of the fifteen slave states abolished slavery—but that these impressive
achievements were not enough to complete the destruction of slavery. They were
necessary but not sufficient. That is, they undermined slavery enough to make a
Thirteenth Amendment possible, but that only by re-writing the Constitution was
slavery finally and fully destroyed.
Manning reads me as saying something quite different: The “cordon of
freedom" failed. It took military emancipation to “crush the beast."
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In Scorpion’s Sting I set out to emphasize that the radical abolitionist policy
was the “cordon," not military emancipation. Military emancipation, I argue, was
a familiar and accepted policy among American statesmen from the Revolution
to the Civil War. This is a very different interpretation from the one put forward
recently by my friend, John Witt, in his book Lincoln’s Code. At the risk of
obscuring the subtlety of Witt’s argument, it can be summarized this way. Before
1863 all American statesmen considered military emancipation a violation of the
“civilized" usages of nations as defined by Enlightenment theorists of limited
war. Lincoln’s Code thus hinges on a tragic paradox. To justify the Emancipation
Proclamation the Lincoln administration had to repudiate the Enlightenment
rules of limited warfare whereas the confederates, in denouncing emancipation,
upheld those Enlightenment principles.
Citing Witt against me, Manning claims that American’s “typically
opposed" military emancipation when, from all the evidence I’ve seen, they all
but universally accepted it. Chapter four of Scorpion’s Sting presents a very
different history of the American understanding of military emancipation in
wartime. The Treaty of Paris, the Jay Treaty, and the Treaty of Ghent all
acknowledged the right of the British to emancipate slaves in wartime. The
Americans themselves offered freedom to slaves in return for military service
during the War of Independence, and they again freed hundreds of slaves during
the Second Seminole War.
What provoked controversy beginning in the 1780s was the slaveholders’
demand that the British return to their masters all those slaves still on the ground
in the United States at the moment the war ended. The British claimed that those
slaves had already been freed and could not be re-enslaved. The slaveholders
wanted those people returned to their masters or, in lieu of re-enslavement,
compensation. The British refused as a matter of principle to re-enslave anyone
actually freed during the war and leading American statesmen—John Jay and
Alexander Hamilton for example—denounced the demand for re-enslavement as
“immoral," “odious," “infamous" and “perfidious." These denunciations of
re-enslavement, grounded explicitly on the Enlightenment theorists of limited
war, were repeated by a number of congressmen during the Jay Treaty debates.
Witt cites John Quincy Adams’s attacks on military emancipation as
representative of the views of American statesmen, but I argue Adams’s
remarks—whether he made them once, twice, or half a dozen times hardly
matters—were extreme. Yet not even Adams went so far as to claim that the
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slaves freed by the British and “carried away" before the war ended had been
illegitimately emancipated. I therefore offer an interpretation that is
fundamentally at odds with Witt’s. Where he sees the Lincoln administration
reversing and the Confederacy upholding a longstanding “American" opposition
to military emancipation, I posit a longstanding American acceptance of military
emancipation alongside an equally longstanding conflict over re-enslavement,
pitting antislavery northerners against proslavery southerners.
Here again I apparently failed to make my own position clear. Without
realizing the depth of the disagreement Manning adopts Witt’s position as correct
and on that basis characterizes my interpretation of Adams as “awkward." But
it’s only “awkward" if you accept Witt’s view that Adams was representative of
an allegedly “universal" American understanding of military emancipation as
violation of the civilized usages of war. I don’t think such a consensus existed,
and I can’t find any American statesmen making claims as extreme as those
made by Adams. To the extent that they were not extreme, it was because
without quite saying so Adams did in fact accept the legitimacy of military
emancipation.
One of the things I tried very hard to do, in both books, was to show that
military emancipation was not designed to abolish slavery and rarely did. Before
the American Revolution it was not uncommon for the British authorities or
American colonists to arm slaves without freeing them, but after 1776 there as
something close to a consensus that arming slaves meant freeing them. I didn’t
highlight the distinction between arming and freeing slaves because, after 1776,
there was no such distinction that I know of in the United States. But I did try to
make it very clear that freeing slaves never meant abolishing slavery—not even
in the Civil War—not even after Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation made
military emancipation “universal." Lincoln was always skeptical of military
emancipation and as late as February, 1865, argued that a constitutional
amendment was necessary because his own proclamation freed only those had
“come within our lines." Republicans in congress had been saying the same thing
for a year or more.
Manning, by comparison, has the impression that I do not make the very
distinctions I tried very hard to make. My chapter on military emancipation, she
writes, “conflates three things—arming slaves, freeing slaves, and ending
slavery—that were simply too distinct to be lumped together." Oakes is correct,
Manning notes, that armies throughout history freed slaves, “but prior wartime
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liberations had often been temporary and reversible, and they had not ended the
institution of slavery." Here my frustration with my own limitations as a writer is
palpable: Manning chides for not saying the very thing I tried very to say—that
military emancipation was neither designed to abolish slavery and rarely did.
Ironically, it is Manning who seems to believe that military emancipation did
succeed in abolishing slavery during the Civil War. Here we may have a real
disagreement rather than a misunderstanding. That military emancipation “would
permanently end the institution was and is a much bigger surprise than chapter
four of The Scorpion’s Sting quite credits." The reason I don’t credit that
interpretation is because I don’t agree with it. Which is fine. Historians disagree
all the time.
My concern is that, once again, my own interpretation is not coming through
as clearly as I had hoped. The “surprise" for me, in researching and writing about
the destruction of slavery, is that military emancipation was not enough to
destroy slavery. By early 1864, the Republican Party took this shortcoming for
granted and for that reason adopted a constitutional amendment as the only sure
way to destroy slavery completely. As I point out in Freedom National, Lincoln
was convinced that if he was not re-elected in 1864—which would likely mean
that Republicans would lose rather than gain the seats they needed in
Congress—the Union would have won the war but slavery would not have been
abolished. We can’t possibly know for sure, but I’m inclined to think Lincoln
was right to worry.
Chandra Manning appears to have more faith than I do in the efficacy of
military emancipation than I do. She posits an “undeniable truth that it took
armies, not policies, to crush the beast." But by her own account, armies almost
never crush the beast. Usually they unleash it. Throughout history far more
people have been enslaved by war than liberated by it. Armies free slaves when
armies are told to free slaves, told by policymakers. War made that policy
possible, but it did not make abolition inevitable. To get slavery abolished, it
took another policy.
One final point. Manning points out that what was happening on the ground
in the South was a lot messier than the policies dictated from Washington would
suggest. She appears to believe that I would dispute this, when in fact I
wholeheartedly endorse it. What I do insist upon is that we cannot possibly know
that the relationship between policy and practice was until we know what the
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policy was, and until now historians have all but universally denied that there
were any meaningful antislavery policies implemented by the Republicans
before the Emancipation Proclamation. As a result, what was going on down on
the ground is consistently misinterpreted.
Consider the policy, demanded by antislavery radicals for decades, that the
fugitive slave clause of the Constitution be enforced only by local civil and
judicial officials—that the federal government should not be the enforcement
agent. Republicans in Congress went on record endorsing this policy early in July
of 1861, and the very beginning of the war. Very quickly—not consistently but
quickly--we see Union soldiers and officers on the ground turning slaveholders
away from their camps, telling the slave-catchers that if they want to recapture
their fugitives they should go to local sheriffs and judges for help, that they
Union Army would not do it. Unaware that this was a policy advocated for
decades by antislavery radicals and affirmed by the House of Representatives
early in the war, social historians dismiss the behavior of such troops. Mistakenly
assuming that there was no federal policy, social historians declare that the Union
soldiers were “sloughing off" the problem on local officials. No doubt the reality
is messier than the policy, but we cannot begin to disentangle the mess from the
policy until we know what the policy was.
An even more profound example of the problem appears in the policy,
adopted by Lincoln throughout the war, of pressuring the states to abolish
slavery on their own. State by state abolition had been the focus of abolitionism
since the 1780s, but by the time Arkansas abolished slavery in early 1864, it was
the first state to do so in sixty years. We know that Lincoln was frenetically
urging state officials to abolish slavery, but only a fool would argue that
Arkansas abolished slavery simply because Lincoln wrote a couple of letters to
General Steele. Put differently, we know what the policy was, but we don’t how
it was related to what was going on in Arkansas. There, on the ground, the
Confederate army had been defeated and expelled from the state. Slaves were
running for their freedom to Union lines. Black soldiers were being recruited
into the Union army in significant numbers, especially in the states that Lincoln
was pressuring to abolish slavery. The slaveholders had obviously been
weakened enough, as a political force, to make antislavery politics viable and
successful by 1864.
On the one hand, we need this sort of account of what was happening on the
ground—particularly, I suspect, with the recruitment of slaves into the Union
5
Oakes: Extended Discussion On: The Scorpion's Sting
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2014
army—to account for the abolition of slavery in Arkansas. On the other hand,
what was going on in Arkansas was the hardly the random byproduct of war.
Were slaves being emancipated inadvertently? Were black soldiers enlisting by
accident? Was it serendipity that slavery was being ripped up on the ground in
Arkansas? Was it mere coincidence that after sixty long years five slave states
suddenly abolished slavery? Is federal policy really that irrelevant?
And here’s the point. Manning believes that the “cordon of freedom"
designed to get states to abolish slavery was a hopeless failure. I believe it was
necessary but not sufficient to get slavery abolished. Manning believes that
military emancipation got slavery abolished. I believe that, like state abolition, it
was necessary but not sufficient. Military emancipation certainly made state
abolition more likely. But in the end, it took a constitutional amendment destroy
slavery completely and permanently—and amendments have to be ratified by
states. Surely it matters that by the time Congress sent the Thirteenth
Amendment to the states for ratification five of the fifteen slave states had
abolished slavery and three more free states had been admitted to the Union. The
policy of state by state abolition, the brainchild of the abolitionist movement,
made the amendment—inconceivable in 1860--feasible by 1865.
Getting slavery abolished was a messy, complicated process. I have
struggled, and am still struggling, to clarify it. That I have failed to make myself
clear to a reader as knowledgeable and intelligent as Chandra Manning—whose
own scholarship I deeply admire—tells me that I still have a lot of work to do.
Chandra Manning:
I am fond of saying (because I believe it) that one of the virtues of studying
history is that it ought to keep us humble. When I say that, I generally mean that
study of the past invites us to realize that however important we might think
ourselves, we are rarely the first to face, and even more rarely, the most skilled at
solving, most problems and situations. Yet sometimes it keeps us humble in even
more direct ways. As a case in point, I always read a book multiple times before
I write a review of it, and when I do write a review, I try very hard for the review
to situate a book within the historiographical conversations that I think it
challenges us to think differently about, rather than take a side or even really to
state my own position; the book and how it challenges us to think, and not the
reviewer, are what are important about a review, in my opinion. Yet in this case,
I did indeed miss a key point of the fourth chapter, and what is more, I seem to
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have conveyed a position that is quite different from the one that I actually hold.
And the irony of it all is that what most worries both James Oakes and I myself
is that the other is missing or minimizing the exact same central point: that the
destruction of slavery was far more difficult a task than anyone was ready for,
and that neither policy nor military emancipation alone was enough to complete
the job.
The one point on which we sometimes talk past each other, and for which I
especially appreciate this opportunity for clarification, is on military
emancipation. I agree completely with Oakes’ position that neither the Lieber
Code nor military emancipation somehow departed from Enlightenment ideas. I
have my own doubts about whether there was ever a “nice" way of war from
which to depart, as I suspect did Francis Lieber, who nearly bled to death on a
battlefield of the Napoleonic War, but that is a somewhat different discussion.
Yet I misread (for which mea culpa) Oakes as arguing that the adoption of
military emancipation was so old hat that there was nothing to it in the Civil War.
My concern was that in portraying its adoption as automatic, we miss some
important things.
One thing I think we miss is that many observers at the time saw it as a
departure, and therefore that there was division rather than consensus about it. I
do not think that members of the northern voting public (whose opinions
mattered to the prosecution of the war) knew the post-1812 Treaty debates nearly
as well as Oakes does, but I do think that they knew the “Star Spangled Banner,"
whose third verse celebrates how “no refuge could save the hireling and slave"
who tried to escape bondage. I also think they knew –because in the summer of
1862 northern newspapers reprinted—John Quincy Adams’ public statements
likening military emancipation to poisoning and assassination, statements that
differed so completely from the personal views that Adams expressed in his
diary at the same time that it’s hard for me to see them as aberrations from rather
than dutiful articulations of the position of the Monroe Cabinet on which he
served. Similarly, Oakes’ treatment of the Jay Treaty and the Seminole War are
without peer. I have no doubt he knows more about those things than me or the
rest of the profession. I also suspect that he knows a lot more about them than
most of the northern public did. If northern newspapers are any guide, especially
in the summer of 1862, the northern public was very divided about the adoption
of military emancipation, not at all of a single mind that it was an obvious road
to take.
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In sum, I think that adoption of military emancipation was more of a fight,
and the outcome of the fight surprises me a little more than it surprises Oakes,
but not because I doubt Republicans’ sincerity about eradicating slavery. I had
hoped actually to make clear in the review that the first three chapters of The
Scorpion’s Sting establish that very sincerity beyond reasonable doubt. (I meant
it when I said, “assign this book.") Still, while throwing the force (literally) of the
U.S. government against rather than on the side of slavery did not mark a
turnaround for Republicans, it did mark a change in direction for a U.S.
government that had spent the nineteenth-century becoming more rather than less
activist on behalf of slaveholders. Portraying the process as automatic risks
minimizing the degree of change it represented, in my view.
I also think the outcome was surprising partly because of a concern that we
don’t think too much about today, but which was very serious at the time, and
that we almost always underestimate when we talk about the Civil War. That
concern was the genuine, legitimate concern about the right relationship between
military and civil authority. Nearly always, that concern was at the heart of what
some historians have seen as (to borrow James Oakes’ phrasing) “sloughing off"
the problem of slavery onto local officials. I think that right relationship was a
very serious matter to nineteenth century Americans, quite different from a
cop-out, and we miss how serious if we see the move to military emancipation as
automatic.
In addition, I think Civil War military emancipation differed in some key
ways from military emancipation as it had transpired in other times and places.
In my review, I missed that Oakes, too, distinguishes between earlier incidences
of military emancipation and post-Emancipation Proclamation military
emancipation in the Civil War. The differences are worth emphasizing,
especially the most important one: in other times and places, emancipation
proved fragile and reversible –in fact, the institution of slavery often emerged
stronger rather than weaker—whereas after the Civil War, the institution itself
was abolished. So I would caution against eliding Civil War emancipation in
with all other instances of military emancipation because I do not think they are
all exactly alike.
But I would also clarify that military emancipation in the Civil War, on its
own and independent of policy, did not destroy slavery; I don’t think the “cordon
of freedom" policy was a total failure, nor do I think that military emancipation
was a cheery success (to be clear: it was usually mayhem), and I fully recognize
8
Civil War Book Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol16/iss4/2
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.16.4.02
that it took military emancipation in conjunction with federal policies that
culminated in the Thirteenth Amendment to legally eradicate the institution of
slavery in the United States. By no means did I mean to dispute Oakes’ work on
any of these points. When I say it took armies to crush the beast, what I mean is
that in 1860 the institution of slavery was so firmly entrenched that there was no
way of uprooting it that did not involve brute force. I have no doubt that policy
mattered and that a Union victory with slavery intact was entirely possible had
different policies been enacted. But I also think that if the story becomes one
solely of policy change, then slavery looks more anemic than it actually was, and
we risk whitewashing the violence right out of the story.
And make no mistake: it was a violent story. The reason, I think, was that
slavery turned out to be a much larger, more flexible, more adaptable, more
resilient institution far more deeply ingrained within the very spinal cord of the
nation than contemporaries (at least northern ones) fully grasped, or than we
really entirely grasp if we see its eradication as a foregone conclusion. In fact,
you might say that James Oakes and I are actually in “violent agreement" on
most points. I am grateful to Oakes and to the Civil War Book Review for the
opportunity to clarify those points, partly so we understand each other better, but
also because I think the questions raised about policy, violence, civil and military
authority, and non-inevitability are really important ones for the field to think
about with clarity and precision.
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